Abstract. Increased public demand for health services, combined with fiscal and operating restraints, has led to the need for programs that will operate efficiently and effectively to achieve their objectives. Establishing such programs requires an understanding of the factors that contribute to their development and implementation. This in turn requires a greater understanding of the policy formulation and policy implementation processes. This paper uses a case study of Michigan's State/Local Cost Sharing Program to explore how policy formulation links to and influences implementation; it considers the interaction between the administrative and political processes and how they are affected by shifting power relations, constituencies, and the environment, and how in turn these affect program leadership and operating policies. The paper develops a model as a framework for monitoring the course of the program through the policy cycle and recommends that the policy process be considered as dynamic, interactive, and evolutionary. The case study approach allows for a greater understanding of the phases of the process, their interaction, and their impact on specific policy outcomes.
policy formulation and policy implementation processes, their interaction, and the variables that influence them. The literature on program development and implementation often treats policy development and implementation as discrete topics in isolation from one another (Bardach 1977; Brown 1983; Giandomenico and Wildarsky 1979; Marmor 1983 Marmor , 1973 Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Redman 1973; Van Horn and Van Meter 1980; Thompson 1981; Levin and Ferman 1985) . However, policy formulation and implementation processes are linked and should be analyzed together to further our understanding of the policy process as a whole.
There is now a small but growing body of literature which looks at both formulation and implementation in the policy process (Foltz 1982; Peterson et al. 1986 ). This paper focuses on the links between these two aspects of the policy process because both contribute to a particular policy outcome and also because linking the two creates a policy continuum or cycle which can be used as a framework for further analysis. Of particular interest is how the policy formulation links to and influences policy implementation, how administrative and political processes interact, and how these in turn are affected by shifting power relations, by changes in program leadership and operating policies, and by modifications in constituencies and the environment.
This analysis uses the case of Michigan's State/Local Cost Sharing Program' to explore these questions. Such an approach is appropriate for three major reasons. First, the area of state/local relations has received far less attention from political scientists than the areas of federahtate or federal/local relationships. Yet, in many respects, these two units of government play key roles in the delivery of human services. Second, many of the same dynamics which have been identified as affecting the policy process at the federal level also appear to be reflected in the policy process at the state and local level. Thus, these case studies can be instructive to those wishing to improve the quality of public policy decisions and their resultant programs at both the state and local level, This case is particularly instructive because it teaches important lessons about the need for continuity in the process and a stable fiscal environment, and about the roles that policy entrepreneurs play in identifying a policy focus through the formulation of legislation and that "post formation fixers," as described by Bardach (1977) , play in the implementation of that policy. Although this analysis deals only with one state, the themes identified appear equally applicable to the other forty-nine.
Figure 1. The Evolving Fblicy Cycle
Framework for the analysis. Figure 1 depicts the model of the policy cycle employed in this analysis. It uses as a beginning a model developed by Kingdon (1984) , which identified the first two phases of the policy process-agenda setting and policy development-but extends it to incorporate the policy implementation phases, the bridge between them being legislative enactment.
In this policy cycle the four phases are distinct from one another, appear sequentially, and are common to a range of programs. Using this framework, one can trace and help explain policy outcomes by following a program back through the phases of the policy cycle. One can also identify the variables in each phase which impact on the program and which influence its outcome.
According to Kingdon, the agenda-setting phase is formed by the joining together of three "process streams"-these being the problems stream, the policies stream, and the politics stream. In the first stream, problems advance to the political forefront in two ways. The first is through the systematic monitoring of key indicators. In the health arena, for example, deaths from selected diseases or among certain population groups are frequently monitored to ascertain the ((health of the population." Unusually high death rates can lead to a move to formulate a policy response-a recent example is infant mortality. Here, a rise in the infant death rate triggered congressional action to expand Title XIX benefits for prenatal care services.' Problems also come to the forefront through "focusing events" or "powerful symbols," such as Chernobyl and New York's homeless. They spur the public to demand action.
The second process stream in Kingdon's model concerns the development and refinement of policy proposals. In this stream, ideas are generated, researched, and reformulated. An example is the Health Care Financing Administration's exploration of capitated payment strategies for the Medicare program before it adopted a method of payment based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).
The third stream, politics, is composed of such factors as public mood-reflected in opinion polls, the demands, positions, and actions of special interest groups, key changes in administrations, and election results. All help determine whether an idea thus refined is enacted into law or remains unfulfilled on the agenda. According to Kingdon, policy change occurs when these three streams converge to create an "opportunity window," a brief period in which circumstances are ripe for action. That window moves the cycle to the policy development phase which encompasses the authoring and enactment of legislation. Involved here are the dynamics of the process that moves a policy idea into law. The primary variables are the roles of the executive and legislative branches of government and their interface with special interest groups and constituents in developing a legislative proposal.
The enactment of legislation initiates the shift from policy formulation to implementation. In the policy operation phase, the focus is on running the program embodied in the law. Of interest are " those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that affect the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions" (Van Horn and Van Meter 1980) . The critical variables are the organizations assigned to carry out the program, the program's goals and objectives, program appropriations, and the rules, standards, and policies established to guide the implementation stages.
The final phase, policy modification, covers changes adopted in response to conditions, both internal and external, which affect the program. Some adaptations will modify and reformulate the original policy design. Others may initiate formal legislation to amend or eliminate the original statutory language.
Taken as a whole, the model provides a framework for monitoring the course of a program through the policy cycle. Further, it allows us to consider the policy process as dynamic, interactive, and evolutionary. While the policy formulation phases shape the implementation activities, the implementation phases often modify the original policy intent. Within this context, using the cost-sharing program as a case study provides a greater understanding of the phases of the policy process and their interaction and impact on a policy outcome.
Phase 1-setting the agenda
The problems. Within Michigan, the development of a public health infrastructure had its beginnings in local government. In 1873, a state board of health was established by statute and charged with "the general supervision of the interests of the health and life of the citizens of the state" (Michigan Department of Public Health 1973). As state government began to assume greater responsibility for addressing public health needs, its role in the public health arena expanded, both as a service deliverer and as a financier of services provided at the local level. In time an informal state/local partnership evolved as responsibility for maintaining the public's health in Michigan became jointly shared. With the adoption of a new state constitution in 1963, the role of state government in the health arena was more formally defined.
Article IV, Section 51, of the constitution provided the legislature with the authority to "pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public's health." Although the constitution defined a more formal role for state government in the health arena, the informal partnership remained, dominated in many respects by the degree of involvement of local units of government in the financing of service delivery. This dominance resulted from the fact that local contributions accounted for a majority of the revenues used to support these services.
Prior to the late 1970s, the state primarily used two approaches to allocate state funds to support local service deli~ery.~ The first was to provide money on a per capita basis. Although the approach was seen as an effective mechanism of distributing resources, the amount of revenues allocated remained limited.4 By the mid-1960s the level of funding provided through this mechanism was viewed as woefully inadequate and unresponsive to the health needs of local areas.
The second vehicle for allocating state funds was the categorical appropriation. Local health departments primarily competed for these program-specific, state categorical awards to deliver select services within their area. This strategy, although providing a larger source of revenue, also had significant limitations. These funds were narrowly targeted and only available to meet a limited set of health needs as defined by the state; they often had burdensome procedural and reporting requirements; and they were awarded through a competitive bid process that often left smaller, more rural health departments, who had limited resources to pursue such grants, out of the game.
Although both approaches had their limitations, they were viewed as mutually agreeable options by both state and local health officials through the late 1950s. By the early 1960s, however, two key concerns had emerged: statewide service availability and local accountability. Although the state, under the constitution, was given the authority to mandate service development, such enactments did not always ensure that these services would be provided at the local level. Much of the problem resulted from the approach taken by the state legislature. By the late 1960s, it often adopted legislation that mandated service delivery, while assigning the responsibility for carrying out the mandate to local levels of government and appropriating little or no state revenues to support the program.
In some areas of the state, particularly where local resources were limited and/or political support for public health was weak, this practice often put local health officers in the position of choosing either very limited implementation of new programs or no implementation at all. This led to the development of program gaps on a statewide basis. In response, local government officials came to feel that the state had utilized inappropriately the authority granted under the constitution and that state-mandated expansions of program capacity should be funded with state revenues.'
State officials also lacked mechanisms to ensure local accountability. This was due in great part to the nature of the state/local partnership. Given the tradition of informality, clear lines of responsibility had never been formulated. For many mandated services, program definitions and reporting requirements had not been standardized; thus, local health departments exercised considerable discretion in the services they delivered and the information they maintained to monitor the program's quality, access, and effectiveness. This lack of accountability, in turn, impeded the state health department in documenting needs and the impact of the dollars already spent. In essence, the situation had become a catch-22, with locals objecting to expanded programs and improved accountability without additional state support, and the state refusing to expand support without additional documentation on the use of current allocations.
The policies. Growing concern that community health needs were not being met prompted the development of two major studies. The first, the Michigan Community Health Services Study of 1963, focused on community health needs, the degree to which they were being met, and issues of organization and financing. The final recommendations, commonly known as the Committee of Forty Report, placed high priority on increased state financial aid for local health departments. In addition, the report recommended modification in the allocation formula to "take into account the programs and services required by Michigan law, local and state public health problems and needs, populations served, and the economic need of the area" (Michigan Community Health Service 1968) .
Unfortunately, these policy issues were not sufficiently salient politically to effect substantive changes in public health financing or organizational arrangements then in place. This lack of action led the state health department in 1973 to commission the Citizens Research Council (CRC) to conduct a study of local health services.
The second study confirmed the findings of the first and further recommended that "the state legislature establish as an objective the reimbursement of 50 percent 5 . Local dissatisfaction with the widespread use of this approach eventually led in the 1970s to the enactment of the Headlee Amendment in a public referendum. The impact of the amendment was very broad. As a result, the state could not require a local unit of government to provide a new service in any area unless the state was willing to bear the full cost of its provision.
6. The Citizens Research Council of Michigan is a private, nonprofit organization supported p imarily by voluntary conmbutions from Michigan's business and industrial community. The council provides information on state and local taxes and spending, governmental organization and operations, and public policy issues. of the state approved costs incurred by county and district health departments in providing the required level of basic public health services," and that the state director be given the authority to "define a program of basic health services in terms suitable for measuring compliance with acceptable service standards" (Citizens Research Council of Michigan 1973). Additional state aid would then be directed toward securing compliance with those standards.
In sum, both the Committee of Forty and CRC reports called for the development of a more formalized state/local partnership for the delivery of public health services. The elements of such a partnership were to include greater state financing of locally delivered services, a well-defined program of services which would be widely available and delivered with acceptable standards of quality, and enhanced local accountability. These elements were soon to become the core of the State/ Local Cost Sharing Program.
The politics.' The timing of the second study proved fortuitous. It occurred in 1973, the Michigan Department of Public Health's (MDPH) centennial year. To observe this anniversary, the Centennial Citizens Conference on Health was convened not only in recognition of this event but also to discuss the state's major health issues. Two conferences were held sequentially-the first for providers, the second for consumers. Conferees at both were committed to achieving a substantive outcome. They not only perceived a critical need for reform in Michigan's health system but also were impatient with the slow pace of change to date.
The conferees from both groups formulated and adopted a resolution. Addressed to the governor and the department, it called for "a thorough and comprehensive review of Michigan's health structure with input from consumers, providers, and government officials concerned with health, with the objective of detailing a comprehensive state policy of health, delineating the authority and responsibility of each government entity within the state which deals with public health, and containing appropriate recommendations for implementation by executive and legislative action." This resolution launched a series of events that led to the creation of the 1974 Public Health Statutes Revision Project (PHSRP), an effort directed at recodifying Michigan's public health laws.
Among those attending the conferences were two individuals destined to play important roles in the recodification project. They were Toby Citrin, a private businessman, a member of the Detroit Board of Health and president of the Michigan Association of Boards of Health; and state representative Raymond C. Kehres (D-Monroe) , vice-chair of the powerful House Appropriations Committee and chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Social Services.* Most fortui-7. The material in this section draws primarily on a document prepared by Richard Strichartz (1982), executive director of PHSRE?
8. As chairman of the subcommittee, Kehres oversaw the annual development of the state's largest departmental budget-Social Services. This budget incorporated revenues for both the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid programs. tously, Representative Kehres had also been the chief legislative architect in a successful effort to recodify Michigan's mental health code, which became Public Act 258 of 1974.
From Kehres's perspective, the conference played into his broader agenda. He viewed public health law reform as the second of a three-part strategy designed to upgrade the quality of services provided by the state in its three major human services departments: Mental Health, Public Health, and Social Services. Kehres perceived all three departments as poorly organized and ineffective in meeting constituents' needs. As a legislator, he believed improving the statutory base underpinning these agencies would help to address this problem.'
At the conference both men spoke to the need for a legal base on which to build a reformed public health system in the state, and the conferees' resolution was heavily influenced by their views. Subsequent conversations among Citrin, Maurice Reizen (director of MDPH), and Theodore Ervin (deputy director) about health law reform focused on the department's interest in proceeding. At that time, department leadership had primarily intended to use such an initiative to reduce the legal fragmentation affecting public health law. The goal was to remove major inconsistencies in existing law and eliminate outdated provisions. Although both Reizen and Ervin were aware of the broader opportunities the effort might present, they were unsure how far they wanted to proceed beyond dealing with the question of statutory obsolescence (Strichartz 1982) .
Concurrently with these conversations, Kehres explored how to proceed with key parties, in and out of the legislature. On 12 July 1974, Kehres, as chairman of the Michigan Legislative Council,l0 made a preliminary presentation on the subject of creating a group to review the public health statutes. Subsequent to that presentation, he also became aware, through discussions with John T. Dempsey, Director of the Department of Management and Budget, and a key advisor to the Governor, that there was executive branch interest in pursuing a thorough examination of the public health statutes. Given this mutual interest, it was decided that a joint study should be created with Kehres as chair and Citrin as vice-chair. On 24 September 1974, the governor issued Executive Order 1974-8, creating a governor's commission. The following day the legislative council passed a resolution creating a legislative committee. A follow-up memorandum from Kehres 9. Kehres had another explicit, but publicly unstated goal, that of merging three agencies into a "super" human services agency. This goal was shared by then governor, William Milliken, and John Dempsey, who was seen as the designee to head such an agency. To accomplish this task, Kehres sponsored H. B . 5435. The bill passed the House and the Senate but died in conference. See Friends of Ray Kehres.
10. The Michigan Legislative Council was established by legislative leadership for the purpose of overseeing the Legislative Service Bureau, a staff agency responsible for drafting bills. They were also charged with reviewing state laws to identify obsolescent statutes and legal inconsistencies. Major efforts to recodify statutes also came under the council's purview. The council's membership consists of equal numbers of House and Senate members.
and Dempsey outlined the methods and purposes. The statement echoed the October resolution but was more specific."
Collectively, the executive order, the legislative council's resolution, and the memorandum gave PHSRP both gubernatorial and legislative endorsement. The governor also directed the state's human services agencies to cooperate with the project and, through the assignment of key staff, to assist in reaching its objectives.
PHSRP's establishment provided the critical window of opportunity needed to place the state/local health partnership issue on the policy agenda. High legislative and executive interest ensured that PHSRP would remain a priority, and financing by the state and the W K. Kellogg Foundation assured adequate resources to accomplish its projects, goals, and objectives. l 2
Phase 2-policy development
The scope of PHSRP was very broad, i.e., to codify all state public health statutes. Subdivisions of the work were necessary. Thus within the PHSRP structure, six work groups were established to deal with a specific set of issues in a major topic area.I3 Each work group was chaired by an academician, who, it was believed, could more easily than state government employees play the required neutral and conciliatory roles in the inevitable conflicts over assignments of responsibility and "turf." The Administration Work Group had as its assignment issues relating to the administration and financing of the public health delivery system. John H. Romani, a political scientist with organizational and administrative expertise, chaired the work group.14 Among other matters the work group was to fix responsibility at the state and local levels of government for the administration of various health laws, address the inequities and limitations present in the existing financing arrangements, and move toward equal provision of a set of minimum health services on a statewide basis. This agenda was similar to that spelled out in both the Committee of Forty and CRC reports. To assist in accomplishing these goals, a special committee on state and local relations was also established.15 11. The project was expected to (1) review the existing public health laws of the state, with special emphasis on the authority of the Department of Public Health and recommend a public health code by 1 January 1976, (2) review state/local public health department responsibilities and roles and make specific, implementable recommendations about their operation in order to improve public health services in Michigan, and (3) submit legislative and related proposals consistent with the proposed code.
12. The initial PHSRP budget was for $419,000, of which $105,000 was adirect state appropriation, $124,000 was in-kind support from MDPH, $93,000 was in-kind support from the University of Michigan and Wayne State University, and $97,000 was from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation.
13. The work groups were: Administration, Funding, and Planning; Data, Research and Development, and Health Education; Environmental and Occupational Health; Health Manpower; Organizational Resources (Health Facilities); and Personal Health Services.
14. Dr. Romani is a professor at the University of Michigan School of Public Health.
15.
As constituted, the administrative work group was comprised principally of state officials. The special advisory committee on state/local relations provided for equal representation from state and local officials.
The special committee worked to develop a new state/local partnership designed to maintain a balance of power between the state and local units of govemment.I6 The partnership was to be operationalized through a new financing arrangement known as "state/local cost sharing." Under cost sharing, state revenues to support public health service delivery would rise annually "subject to the availability of funds actually appropriated" according to a set formula. Concurrently, local health departments would become increasingly accountable, through compliance with established performance standards and the provision of appropriate assurances that services were delivered.
Conceptually, cost sharing was based on both the state and locals "buying in" to a defined set of services. It was neither a block grant (i.e., a defined sum of money allocated from one level of government to another with only minimal restrictions on its expenditure) nor a categorical approach (i.e., a defined sum of money allocated from one level of government to another, the expenditure of which is governed by a specific set of goals and objectives to be achieved), but rather a blend of the two-one viewed by the special committee as incorporating the best of both. It was seen as meeting the state's interest by fostering local accountability and as meeting the local's interest because it provided long-term, flexible state financing, targeted at meeting a set of locally defined needs.
These provisions were adopted by the Administrative Work Group and PHSRP and were embodied in the Part 24 provisions of the draft Public Health Code Statute. The provisions of the state/local partnership as incorporated in the Public Health Code are listed in Appendix 1 of the code. Three of the proposal's unique provisions deserve mention. First, state dollars would be earmarked to support the delivery of two types of services, required and allowable. Required servicesthose services mandated by law or by rule and deemed essential for delivery across the state-responded to the state's interest in securing a basic set of services available to all residents through the local public health infrastructure. Allowable services-those provided at the discretion of local health departments-were targeted at meeting unique local needs.
Under the proposal's "maintenance of effort" provisions, eligibility for participation required that local governments-in order to participate in the cost-sharing program-maintain at least the level of expenditure devoted to public health immediately prior to the code's enactment. This would ensure that expanded state revenues would lead to expanded service delivery as opposed to local dollar replacement.
The proposal's "hold harmless" provisions assured that no local health department would be penalized for not appropriating new revenues to support public health service delivery until fifty-fifty cost sharing was reached. At that time, local governments would be responsible for appropriating funds to support 50 percent of the cost of required services. This provision directly responded to the local objection of the state's enacting mandates without appropriating funds to support them.
As developed, the proposal was supported by the state health department and its local counterparts. Both sides viewed the approach as a far better alternative than the status quo. From the state health department's perspective, the new partnership provided sufficient financial clout to assure local accountability and compliance with state-established performance standards while the cost-sharing formula provided local counties with a greater incentive to invest in public health. The allocation formula, coupled with administrative discretion, provided local health departments with the necessary flexibility to target resources to meet identified needs. Through such a mechanism the state would commit sufficient resources to support service delivery without assuming responsibility for the local public health delivery system, a prospect viewed with some concern by local officials." Thus, local health officers felt they would continue to control the flow of resources within their own jurisdictions. Both the balance in fiscal and administrative responsibility outlined in the provisions made the state and localities equal partners in delivering public services.
Legishtive enactment. Although enactment of the code proved to be a lengthy process, the cost-sharing provisions were only nominally controversial for several reasons. First, as drafted, the Public Health Code encompassed some two hundred pages and nineteen articles. The sheer volume of material and the range of issues represented significantly reduced the degree to which any individual section of the code received close legislative scrutiny. Two sections in particular proved to be political lightning rods. One, Article 15, governing all health occupations, dramatically redefined many of the licensing and credentialing provisions applied in the state to licensed health professions. The second, Article 17, incorporating the state's bed reduction plan,'* focused political attention on efforts to contain health care costs by reducing licensed hospital capacity.
17. Within Michigan, both the local mental health and social services systems are predominantly state-supported and state-run. At the time of these deliberations, concerns were expressed by county commissioners and members of local boards of health that public health might follow the same pattern.
18. The bed reduction provisions arose out of another effort initiated by Ray Kehres to reduce health care costs, thus preserving the ability of the Medicaid program to meet the health care needs of the poor. Kehres were able to secure the commitment of the Big Three automakers and the United Auto Workers union to pursue legislation to reduce Michigan's excess hospital capacity through regulatory means. Although originating as separate legislation, the bed reduction provisions were ultimately merged into the broader language of the Public Health Code. This merger joined the interests of these Legislative debate concerning the cost-sharing program focused almost entirely on the program's cost implications. Although the project had run cost estimates indicating the need for $50 million in additional state revenues by the fifth year of financing, legislators who opposed enactment of the provisions solely on fiscal grounds faced three significant counterarguments. First, the cost-sharing formula incorporated the words "subject to the availability of funds." This addition provided a safety valve to assure that annual expenditures and revenues remained balanced. Second, the program's five-year phase-in period made annual revenue increases appear manageable. Finally, opposing the provisions meant opposing the allocation of new revenues to support service enhancements in one's district, which very few legislators wished to do. For these reasons, legislators had every incentive to get on the bandwagon of support. Thus, on 26 June 1978, the Public Health Code, embodying the Part 24 cost-sharing provisions, was enacted by the legislature.
Phase 3 -policy operation
Implementation of the Part 24 provisions was initiated during the summer of 1979. Within MDPH, responsibility for program operations fell to the Office of Local Health Services (OLHS), created for this purpose. OLHS was headed by William Clexton, a veterinarian recruited from the ranks of Michigan's local health officers. l 9 During the early stages, two strategic organizational decisions were made which decisively influenced the program's implementation. First, although OLHS was responsible for cost-sharing implementation, it was not given direct oversight authority for programs delivered by local health departments. These functions were retained in the department's five major bureaus responsible for program operations. The bureaus had traditionally provided resources to local health departments and monitored their performance. Thus, in order to function as called for in the legislation, OLHS became a "broker" between bureau staff and local health department leadership.20
Second, although cost sharing subsumed the old per capita funding formula, it did not incorporate funds supporting a broad range of categorical programs opfour powerful groups with those of the traditional public health community. For a detailed discussion of the bed reduction initiative see Paul-Shaheen and Carpenter (1982) and Carpenter and Paul-Shaheen ( 1984) .
19. Prior to joining the state health department, Dr. Clexton had served as head of the Detroit City Health Department, overseeing the delivery of public health services to the residents of Michigan's largest city.
20. Implementation of the cost-sharing program was handled through a contractual agreement negotiated between MDPH and each of the local health departments. The agreement contained four major parts: a narrative composed of standard contract language, a budget identifying planned expenditures and funding sources, a program statement identifying all services eligible for cost sharing and their status, and the cost-shared service proposals describing the services to be cost-shared and the objectives to be attained. erated by the bureaus. As a result, the contractual arrangements developed by OLHS for the cost-sharing program became an add-on, as opposed to a replacement, for the contracts used by the bureaus as a mechanism to allocate categorical funds. 21 In order to provide a framework for negotiation, the office convened an advisory group-the Part 24 Committee-to provide policy guidance in developing an implementation strategy. 22 A major issue addressed early was determining which services were eligible for state financing under the program. Local representatives were interested in having as many services as possible included in this category, as this would maximize their ability to capture state revenues under the formula. Although state officials may have favored a more conservative approach, two facts argued for the inclusion of services. First, limitations on the information available to identify specific service costs within local health departments' budgets made serious consideration of any alternatives problematic .23 Second, any limitation of service eligibility would have required implementing the politically difficult process of priority setting and elimination. As a result, with the exception of one or two minor programs, all services provided were deemed eligible. Concurrently, with the same minimal exceptions, the total local budget (minus revenues generated from statutorily prohibited sources) became the basis upon which the state's match was calculated. Such application of the department's cost-sharing formula also provided the potential for unintended side effects. Under the formula, the department was to reimburse local governing bodies for the reasonable and allowable costs of required and allowable services-subject , of course, to the availability of funds. Such reimbursements were to be made in a manner that provided equitable distribution among the local governing entities pursuant to the following schedule: (a) first year, 20 percent, (b) second year, 30 percent, (c) third year, 40 percent, and (d) fourth year and thereafter, 50 percent. During the first critical years of implementation, strict application of the formula to the local revenue base left several small departments with limited revenues, with 21. In fiscal year 1979, the total amount expended under the cost-sharing program was $16,184,168. Total local expenditures during that year were $157,947,018. Thus, cost sharing represented 10.2 percent of the total. Other expenditures incorporated in the total were local contributions eligible for cost sharing $63,770,228 (40.4 percent), state categorical funding $38,755,431 (24.5 percent), and other sources ineligible for cost sharing $39,237,191 (24.8 percent).
22. The committee was chaired by a local health officer who concurrently served as chair of the Michigan Health Officers Association. According to state health department policy that organization was officially recognized as representing the interests of local public health in Michigan. The group had equal representation from local health departments and the state department's bureaus, with OLHS providing staff support.
23. Under budgeting practices employed at the local level, revenues and expenditures were recorded according to standard budget principles. Thus, although a health officer might be able to identify expenditures in the broad categories of administration, personal, or environmental services, it was not possible for that individual to identify the resources allocated to or utilized by a specific service such as "restaurant inspection." The Part 24 provisions had recognized this potential concern and created an avenue for redress through a "hold harmless" provision. Under this provision, no local health department would receive less in state funds than it had prior to implementation of the program.
This problem was expected to disappear quickly, as the percentage of state funds moved from the 20 to 50 percent level. If state revenue increases stagnated, however, several local departments would be forced to continue "deficit" funding.
Select operating policies also proved troublesome during the program's operational phase, Reallocation agreements and the designation of cost-shareable services are good examples. Reallocation agreements were unique arrangements established between a local health department and other local agencies to expand the local health department's cost-sharing base. These agreements allow departments executing them to "draw down" a larger share of the total state cost-sharing dollars available. Although available to all departments, they have been executed primarily by the larger and medium-sized department^,^^ entities which have benefited most under the program generally. This has contributed to the perception that the cost-sharing program was inequitable in meeting the needs of all departments. Additionally, because the state's annual cost-sharing appropriation is fixed, the degree to which any one local health department is able to attract additional resources through this mechanism must be offset by a deduction in the state dollars allocated among the others, i.e., the gains by some must be offset by losses of others.
Service designation was also a problem. The code's original intent was to create a small category of select services, known as "required services" which would be available statewide. The department, however, faced significant pressure to expand the list. Local health officials viewed such designations favorably, primarily because they considered it easier to secure a funding commitment locally if a program was a state mandate. Where the program was optional, commissioners exercised greater discretion in choosing whether or not to fund it. As a result, during the first five years of the program, the required services category was expanded from twelve to twenty services. As the list grew, the number of locations demonstrating gaps in these services increased, a situation which worked against the goal of achieving statewide coverage of all required services.
This action, when combined with the incorporation of almost all remaining services provided by local health departments under the allowable service category, resulted in a significant expansion in the range and type of programs deemed eligible for incorporation into the cost-sharing base. The resulting diffusenesssome fifty-five different "services" being included in calculating the local base for matching by state funds-clouded the focus of cost sharing and limited the impact of state support on basic addressing needs. It further encouraged "gamesmanship" on the part of both state and local units to bring activities within the framework of the cost-sharing formula (Resource for Public Health Policy 1987).
Program operations were also significantly affected by dramatic changes in the environment. During the latter part of 1979, Michigan led the nation into a severe recession. The economic downturn, triggered by the second oil crisis, resulted in a significant reduction in U.S. auto sales-an industry upon which Michigan's economy is critically dependent. In response to falling tax revenues, the governor ordered all departments to cut their proposed fiscal year 1980 expenditures to meet the constitutional requirement for a balanced budget. To implement the order, MDPH leadership decided to target the cost-sharing line for most of these reduction~.*~ Several reasons were offered for this strategy. First, because of its size, the cost-sharing line was a revenue source large enough to absorb the necessary reductions. Second, the approach would diffuse the reduction's impact because the cuts would be spread across all forty-eight local health departments, the bulk of whose revenues came from local sources. Third, because of the project's newness, the impact of the reductions would be less severe, given that local health departments had just begun gearing up to spend the revenues.
Due to the extended recession, four budget reductions were required during the 1979-83 period with the cost-sharing line absorbing the bulk of the cuts directed at local public health. As a result, the anticipated move from 20 to 50 percent state financing never materialized, as state cost-sharing revenues remained at or below the first year 20 percent allocation for the full implementation period.
The program was also impacted by a series of leadership changes both within and outside MDPH. Shortly after the code's enactment, Reizen stepped down as director of the state health department. Deputy Director Ervin became interim director until August 1981 when Dr. Bailus Walker was permanently appointed as director. Shortly after Walker's arrival, Ervin left the department. Unfortunately, Walker assumed his post during the last eighteen months of Governor Milliken's final term. When the governor's chosen successor, Lt. Governor James Brickley, lost the election to his Democratic opponent, Congressman James Blanchard, Walker's tenure was ended. The new administration chose Gloria Smith, dean of the School of Nursing at the University of Oklahoma, as director. Early in her term, Smith recruited Joseph Farrell to serve as the department's deputy for administration. Shortly after his arrival, Farrell undertook a major department-wide reorganization which resulted in Clexton being reassigned to another position, the OLHS being dismantled, and the cost-sharing functions being absorbed into the newly created Bureau of Community Services. Individuals recruited to administer the bureau had, for the most part, not been involved in the administration of the cost-sharing program.
Outside the department, Representative Kehres, the code's chief legislative architect, and Representative Gohemere, chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Public Health, retired. Representative Hood, chair of the House Public Health Committee, lost a Senate election bid and concurrently his House seat, and Senator Otterbacher, chair of the Senate Public Health Committee, lost a congressional bid and concurrently his Senate seat. Although individuals assuming.these posts may have been sympathetic to the program, they lacked both legislative seniority and an in-depth understanding of the issues.
The implications. The department's decision to have the cost-sharing line absorb the bulk of the budget reductions had several lasting effects. First, because cost sharing became the major target, this action called into question the state commitment to a strong state/local partnership. Second, the action served to awaken the local political coalition that had been lobbying to provide additional revenues for cost sharing. This group, which included OLHS leadership, local health officers, county commissioners, and members of the local boards of health, had succeeded in convincing legislators to fund cost sharing at $24 million for the second year. This amount was slightly short of the 30 percent targeted by the formula for the second year of phase-in. As a consequence of the department's action, this political victory was sacrificed. Finally, the department's willingness to target the program for cuts fueled the Department of Management and Budget's (DMB) opposition. Officials at DMB, the state agency responsible for developing the governor's budget, had never been strong cost-sharing supporters. With the perceived change in MDPH support, DMB became more vociferous in arguing against it, thus increasing the hurdles to be overcome in garnering additional revenues later.
These hurdles became even more monumental as the state's populace grew more conservative politically. Michigan followed a national trend first evidenced in California with the enactment of Proposition 13, a referendum to limit the taxes paid by California residents. The extent of the populace's opposition was dramatically expressed in November of 1983, when two Michigan legislators were recalled for voting for an increase in the state's income tax rate, an action deemed necessary to balance the budget and halt further service erosion. These recalls, the first of their kind in Michigan's political history, left a lasting impression on both the governor and the legislature. Although Michigan's economy rebounded during the latter half of the 1980s' the state's political leaders have repeatedly resisted using budget surpluses to finance major program expansions. Rather, these revenues have been consistently targeted toward reducing the state's tax burden and retiring the debt.
These self-imposed limits on revenue growth added to the difficulties of increasing the cost-sharing line. If new revenues were unavailable, then increases in cost sharing would have to come at the expense of other programs, within either the department or state government as a whole. This made the stakes of the game extremely high, placing more demands on the requestors than might have been imposed under different circumstances. Leadership changes within MDPH also left the program without powerful stewardship during a period of significant organizational change and budget reductions. Since no one on the inside was available to build and nurture key relationships with local health officials, a lack of cohesion resulted among the local health departments. External legislative changes left the program without a significant oversight group, one which could have influenced the department to maintain cost-sharing implementation as a major priority or, concurrently, influenced the appropriations process to maintain a significant level of funding for continuation. Additionally, the historical importance of a costsharing program became diffused, as new individuals with different priorities and goals assumed positions of power. Thus, although there were key policy entrepreneurs (e.g., Kehres and Citrin) available during the program formulation stages to guide its development, there were no post-formation fixers (Bardach 1977) individuals who, during the implementation phases, hold key positions and are able to make the necessary programmatic changes to assure continued viability. This type of leadership was distinctly lacking during the implemention phases due to the large number of leadership changes in and outside the department and the department's reorganization.
During the policy formulation phases, the cost sharing had also benefited indirectly in two other ways unavailable during the policy implementation phases. First, the PHSRP process garnered a large group of supporters who came together to gain legislative endorsement. Although many of these individuals had no direct interest in the cost-sharing program, their interest in the code per se helped guarantee enactment of the cost-sharing program by virtue of its incorporation in the code. Second, the amount of money available to PHSRP supported the hiring of a competent staff and allowed for extensive communication with the public and the press. As a result, word of the project was widely spread. This encouraged many more groups and individuals to participate actively and support the process than might have done so otherwise, which also added momentum to support the code's enactment.
Following enactment, a majority of the more powerful interest groups went on to address other agendas, leaving implementation issues to the traditional public health constituency. This constituency, composed primarily of local health officers, members of local boards of health, and some county commissioners, was viewed as politically weak. They were not used to high-stakes political lobbying and lacked the political capital necessary to be of significant influence. When the budget crisis hit, they were at a considerable disadvantage, as the lack of broad constituent support combined with legislative leadership changes weakened the cost-sharing program in this debate.
Critical also was the split that developed within the local public health community as a result of the application of the cost-sharing formula. Before enactment, cost sharing was widely endorsed by the total local public health community, which believed that all would benefit from the program's implementation. The realities of implementation, however, eroded the support of the smaller and more rural departments. The lack of increases in the state's matching rate prolonged indefinitely the length of time counties in a deficit-funding situation remained there. This created a series of "haves" and "have nots" and split the local public health community on how to resolve the problem most appropriately. Most importantly, it led some of the smaller departments to move away from supporting the position of endorsing additional increases in the cost-sharing line to one of endorsing alterations in the cost-sharing formula to make it more "equitable." This internal schism reduced the constituency's ability to reflect a united front and deliver a common message to the legislature on how the program should be dealt with.
The initial decision to allow almost all services eligible for cost sharing to be included in the funding base had two substantive effects. First, it contributed to legislative reluctance to expand financing for the program in later years. During the initial debate on the code, projections of total state support required to finance the program at fifty-fifty identified the need for a $50 million state match. By 1987, state contributions required to support the program at fifty-fifty exceeded $1 20 million, an amount reflecting the combined increases of program expansion and inflation.26 Second, they impeded the department's ability to demonstrate the 26. This amount reflects the impact of program expansion estimated at 50 percent of the total and inflation.
impact of the funds on improving health outcomes. As the funds were used to support almost every local program, the effect of the additional revenues on any one service became difficult to identify. Thus, the department had no ability to respond definitively to the question, "What have the additional state revenues allocated through cost sharing really achieved?"
Failure by the state to adhere to the cost-sharing formula also prevented the accountability provisions from being realized and proved, in most cases, to be an insufficient incentive to increase local expenditures for public health services. *' While the state shortfall was initially linked to the recession, in later years both the executive office and the legislature have been reluctant to increase the costsharing appropriation without gaining a greater understanding of what the funds are buying. This has placed the department in an interesting dilemma. Given that increased local accountability was predicated on increased state financing, local health departments are resisting additional reporting demands unless they are coupled with increased revenues. However, legislators are reluctant to expand funding until they understand better the impact of existing appropriations.
An assessment. The cost-sharing program suffered a series of setbacks in the implementation phases. Despite the problems encountered, implementation of the program did result in a tripling of the state dollars appropriated to local health departments. Given the timing of the increase, local health departments were able to dampen the negative effects of double-digit inflation, the recession, and federal revenue reductions on service delivery.
While recognizing this important gain, much of the perceived potential of Part 24 has not been achieved. Although discretionary state funds allocated for local use did increase, the anticipated growth in the cost-sharing program never materialized. This lack of expanded state support prevented the accountability provisions from being realized and, in many cases, has proven to be an insufficient incentive for increased local expenditures and service expansion. As a result, the program's major goals, those of achieving financing equity, enhancing local accountability, and guaranteeing the availability of a core set of public health services across the state, have not been realized.
With hindsight, one can suggest a number of things which might have been done differently during the policy development and policy implementation phases. For example, during policy development, simulation studies analyzing the impact of the cost-sharing formula on local health departments of various sizes might have led to adoption of a somewhat different approach to accommodate the needs of smaller departments. The actual application of the formula to many small local 27. The recession also impacted the willingness of local county authorities to expand local public health revenues. During the 1980s many local communities experienced actual declines in the stateequalized value of property and increased unemployment. Both conditions limited the degree to which local units of government could effectively meet local obligations, much less expand them.
health departments during the first two years resulted in their receiving less money under the program than they had received under per capita financing. This situation occurred for two reasons-first, because of the limited nature of the local contribution, and second, because the per capita financing had built in a floor (of $5,000) , as a minimum amount to be allocated per county regardless of its size. Use of a greater portion of the funds initially to pump new revenues into these small departments would have allowed them to benefit substantively from the program in its first and second years of operation. Such a strategy might have avoided the resulting split which occurred between the "haves" and the "have nots," promoting greater unity among the locals and enhancing political support.
Eliminating the section on reallocation agreements also would have been wise. Rather than provide an opportunity for public health to expand its influence in a local community, the implementation of this provision simply exacerbated the problem of "haves" and "have nots" by allowing the larger departments initially to draw down more cost-sharing revenues at the expense of the smaller.
Rather than rely on general funageneral revenues to finance the cost-sharing program, other financing mechanisms might have been pursued, for example, earmarking funds from a select revenue source, such as a cigarette or alcohol tax. Once acquired, these sources provide a more stable form of program revenues.
During implementation, it would have been more effective to match cost-sharing funds only with required services. This approach would have generated three distinct benefits. First, it would have reduced the effort involved in developing a data system for the program. This, in turn, would have allowed OLHS to demonstrate the program's impact in a much shorter span of time. Concurrently, it would have limited the total new state revenues required to move from the 20 to 50 percent funding level. This might have promoted continued legislative support for the program and allowed the requested increase in the appropriation, given that the funds needed to provide the expected match would be far more limited. Finally, it would have assured the availability of a core set of services on a statewide basis-a major goal of the program. This achievement might have encouraged continued legislative support and provided positive feedback to the public health constituency, thus encouraging their continued efforts.
It also would have been more effective to promote cost-sharing as a "financing mechanism," i.e., a basic revenue source, as opposed to a "program," i.e., an initiative viewed as having a specific set of goals and objectives and designed to serve a select population. This would have linked cost-sharing with all other revenue streams supporting local health service delivery. Cost-sharing then would not have been highlighted in the budget as a separate and distinct funding line, an approach which made it an appealing internal and external target for revenue reductions. Had cost sharing been defined in this way, legislative expectations for the program's impact might also have been minimized, and the use of cost-sharing funds to support a broad range of programs delivered by local health departments might have been viewed as more legitimate.
Recognizing the importance of the phrase "subject to the availability of funds," incorporated in the cost-sharing formula, the department and OLHS might have emphasized the need it created for a strong constituency and continuing dialogue with the legislature to assure continued support for the program. Such actions would have minimized or eliminated the perceived entitlement created by the program. As it was, the operative impact of this language was often ignored during the implementation phases. Thus, the failure of the legislature to appropriate funds sufficient to meet the targets specified was frequently viewed by the locals as an abrogation of legislative responsibility, rather than an inability on the locals' part to mobilize an effective constituency to expand the revenues.
An independent oversight function could have been established to monitor the program's progress during the implementation stages. Financing could have been secured in one of two ways-either through setting aside a certain percentage of the entire annual cost-sharing appropriation for this purpose or through pursuit of foundation funds. For example, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation might have been persuaded to support such an effort for a limited period as an extension of its commitment to the code's enactment. Such funds could have supported an independent staff assigned oversight responsibility for monitoring the department's progress in implementing the code's provisions. This function could have linked the executive and legislative branches through a reporting requirement. With such a mechanism and with the original PHSRP leadership, a firmer link between those responsible for policy development and those responsible for implementation might have been achieved.
Phase 4-policy modijkation
In the final analysis, the cost-sharing program suffered significant setbacks on several fronts. Given this situation, it is illusory to think that one or two program modifications would have significantly altered the outcome. Rather, an assessment of the policy objective and the ability of the program as developed seemed more appropriate, given the significant environmental changes experienced.
In response, Representative Robert Emerson and Senator Connie Binsfeld, chairs of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Public Health, conducted a series of public hearings around the state. The hearings provided an opportunity for local constituents to air their views on the program and gave the legislators a greater understanding of the problems local health departments were experiencing with the cost-sharing provisions. Because of this renewed legislative interest, Dr. John Romani was asked by department leadership to identify the program's current problems and to propose a series of policy options to address them. The resultant document, "Cost Sharing: Issues and Options" (Resource for Public Health Policy 1987), has become a focal point for discussion among state and local representatives convened by the department to develop alternative recommendations for program funding and operation. That group, a revitalized version of the Part 24 Committee, has recently proposed a new budget request and series of amendments to the cost-sharing provisions of the Public Health Code.28 Collectively, the amendments address many of the issues highlighted in this article.
Some important conclusions and a silver lining
The present case study has broad applications. First, in line with Kingdon's work, it emphasizes that a policy window must open, providing the opportunity for a particular issue to be placed high up on the political agenda. Just as important, however, it emphasizes that this opportunity will not guarantee a successful outcome. To ensure this, the key variables influencing both the policy formulation phases and the policy implementation phases must remain relatively constant and integrated during the critical initial years of implementation. For example, the chances for success are clearly enhanced when legislative policy entrepreneurs responsible for developing a policy strategy remain in office and in communication with and supportive of those assigned the task of program implementation. Also critical are the roles of those individuals who during the implementation phases serve as post-formation fixers, thus assuring the ability of the program to adapt effectively to changes in the environment. Both of these groups must also agree on the program's goals and objectives and the priority assigned to each if implementation is to succeed. Where leadership changes occur and leave a policy vacuum within the agency assigned programmatic responsibility, they may have to be countered by the application of strong oversight on the part of the governor, the legislature, or the constituency (Thompson 1981) .
Critical also is a supportive, stable environment, one in which adequate resources are available to fund program implementation. Periods of severe budget constraint or economic downturn are difficult for new programs. Oftentimes these 28. The amendments reflect a number of the lessons learned over the course of the program's operation, First, budget and programmatic elements are now linked together, i.e., the implementation of the program cannot proceed without the necessary appropriations. Second, cost sharing is redefined as a financing stream which will be integrated with the department's categorical and block grant revenues. Third, state financing at the fifty-fifty matching rate will be limited to supporting 11 redefined, required services. State funding will be designed to support 50 percent of the net allowable cost of providing these services at minimum standards for 100 percent of the estimated needldemand. This approach will assure the availability of these services across the state. Fourth, state hnding will also be identified to support a basic capacity (infrastructure) in each local health department. This capacity is defined as the ability to organize and staff the department, conduct surveillance and health planning activities, and provide financial management, medical direction and public information and education. Fifth, state funding in the form of block grants will be distributed to local health departments to provide an array of services (formerly defined as allowable services) aimed at achieving specific objectives according to local pnorities. The block grant areas are maternal and child health, environmental health, chronic disease control, and access to care. It is proposed that the additional $15 million in revenues required to complete these programmatic changes be drawn from a combination of general fund and special revenue sources. Special revenue sources under discussion include increasing the tax on smokeless tobacco, eliminating the sales tax exemptions on amusements and recreational services, personal services, and repair services, and eliminating the income tax exemption on lottery winnings. are periods of change and restructuring, when the competition for scarce resources increases. Where a program is new, it will not be as well entrenched within the bureaucracy nor will it have as large a staff or constituency threatened by revenue losses. Thus, it will be more vulnerable to funding limitations or reductions. In the world of program implementation, it is far easier to defer the proposed than to dismantle the existing.
A solid constituency is critical in both the policy formulation and implementation phases. During policy development these groups will assist in keeping the issue on the policy agenda and in framing the policy outcome. During the implementation phases, supportive constituencies can maintain the program as a priority within the bureaucracy, as well as promoting its visibility within the legislature and the governor's office. Their role can be particularly important during the appropriations process, given that programs with significant constituency support are often the ones that receive increased legislative attention and additional revenues.
Most importantly, as Levin and Ferman (1985) have pointed out, the essence of policy-making is a learning process. Within this context, policy implementation, in particular, is a testing and feedback process. In this regard, one of the more significant functions served by implementation is that of feedback. If conducted properly, implementation serves to facilitate error detection and program correction. Given this definition, one can use the model of the policy cycle employed in this analysis as a way to characterize the entire policy formulatiodimplementation process as a "dynamic cycle" with a series of discrete phases. The model also provides an opportunity to highlight the linkage between policy formulation and implementation and underscores the fact that policy adaptation occurs throughout the cycle in response to changes in the environment. Some of these adaptations may enhance the opportunity for success, others for failure. With the evolutionary framework of the model, however, failure itself offers opportunity: an opportunity for reassessment and further adaptation-adaptation to create a better fit between the desired policy option and the environment in which it must be implemented.
